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TAKING DE MINIMIS OUT OF THE MIX:
THE SIXTH CIRCUIT THREATENS TO PULL THE PLUG ON
DIGITAL SAMPLING IN BRIDGEPORT MUSIC, INC.
V. DIMENSION FILMS
I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout the history of music, artists and composers have
stolen ideas from their predecessors and contemporaries. 1 Digital
sampling represents the latest method through which artists take
pieces of pre-existing works and incorporate them into new compo-
sitions.2 While digital sampling allows artists to push the bounda-
ries of musical creativity, it likewise pushes at the conventions of
copyright law, spawning a myriad of litigation.3 As parties within
the music industry engage in a contentious internal battle, copy-
right law struggles to reconcile its fundamental purpose - to pro-
tect existing works without further stifling creativity.4
In Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films (Bridgeport I),5 the
Sixth Circuit eliminated the de minimis6 standard regarding the digi-
tal sampling of sound recordings, creating a new, simple rule: "get a
1. See, e.g., Heim v. Universal Pictures Co., 154 F.2d 480, 488 (2d Cir. 1946)
(acknowledging classical composer Handel directly copied other composers).
From classical composers to contemporary rappers, musicians have long made use
of prior artists' works. See Kenneth M. Achenbach, Comment, Grey Area: How Re-
cent Developments in Digital Music Production Have Necessitated the Reexamination of
Compulsory Licensing for Sample-Based Works, 6 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 187, 188 (2004)
(noting "[slampling has been used in hip-hop, dance, and other genres of music
for well over a quarter of a century"). For a more detailed discussion of how digital
sampling has historical predecessors, see infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
2. See A. Dean Johnson, Comment, Music Copyrights: The Need for an Appropri-
ate Fair Use Analysis in Digital Sampling Infringement Suits, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 135,
135-40 (1993) (describing evolution of digital sampling, its creative potential, and
its use by artists).
3. For a discussion of the numerous copyright infringement actions initiated
in the Bridgeport cases alone, see infra note 15 and accompanying text.
4. See Copyright Law Revision: Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties, and the Administration ofJustice of the Comm. of the Judiciary on H.R. 223, 94th
Cong. 475-79 (1975) (testimony of Donald D. Merry, President, Sicom Electronics
Corp.) (describing incentives given by copyright protection). Copyrights can be
thought of as a "dangling carrot," by which Congress encourages individuals to
create works beneficial to society in exchange for limited exclusive rights to that
work. See id. at 475 (balancing creation of incentives with exclusivity).
5. 383 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2004), amended on reh'g, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005)
(clarifying prior holding upon similar basis).
6. See Ringgold v. Black Entm't Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 74-75 (2d Cir.
1997) (interpreting legal maxim de minimis non curat lex as "the law does not con-
cern itself with trifles").
(103)
1
Kim: Taking De Minimis out of the Mix: The Sixth Circuit Threatens to
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2006
104 VILANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
license or do not sample." 7 Although such a ruling will allow courts
to apply a uniform and judicially manageable standard, the analyti-
cal foundation of the court's reasoning is statutorily questionable,
and policy concerns suggest a different outcome may be more
appropriate.8
This Casenote examines the Sixth Circuit's reasoning in
Bridgeport in light of the applicable copyright law, as well as policy
concerns affecting the music industry. Section II provides a de-
tailed discussion of the facts of the Bridgeport case. Section III de-
scribes copyright law pertinent to copyrights in both musical
compositions and sound recordings, as well as the substantial simi-
larity and de minimis standards used in determining copyright in-
fringement. Additionally, Section III provides a brief history of
digital sampling in music, and also discusses other attempts by
courts to deal with copyright infringement regarding digital sam-
pling. Section IV discusses the Sixth Circuit's reasoning in light of
the relevant case law and statutes. Section V looks at the potential
shortcomings of the Bridgeport holding by analyzing copyright stat-
utes and market factors. Finally, Section VI 1) posits that Bridgeport
will ultimately lead to a torrent of litigation, stifling creativity in the
music industry, and 2) presents alternative solutions.
II. FACTS
In 1998, Dimension Films released the film I Got the Hook Up.9
The film depicts the tale of two friends, who discover a truck full of
cellular telephones, played by rap impresario "Master P"10 and
Anthony "A.J." Johnson.'" Looking to get rich quick, the friends
sell the cellular phones, which eventually malfunction, raising the
7. Bridgeport I, 383 F.3d at 398.
8. For a more detailed critique of the Sixth Circuit's statutory and policy anal-
ysis, see infra notes 135-61 and accompanying text.
9. See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films (Bridgeport II), 230 F. Supp.
2d 830, 833 (M.D. Tenn. 2002), rev'd, 383 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2005) (describing film
release).
10. See Stephen Thomas Erlewine, Allmusic Master P Biography, http://www.
allmusic.com (search "Master P") (last visited Oct. 9, 2005) (providing biography
of rapper Master P). Master P, born Percy Miller, "created a hip-hop empire" via
his independent label, No Limit Records. Id. 1-2. Despite very little MTV or
mainstream media exposure, No Limit burgeoned, and Master P expanded the
reach of his business pursuits, managing athletes, trying out for the Toronto Rap-
tors, and finally, released the film I Got the Hook Up. See id. 4-5 (chronicling
development of No Limit's numerous enterprises).
11. See I Got the Hook Up, The Internet Movie Database, http://us.imdb.
com/title/tt0131436 (last visited Oct. 9, 2005) (detailing plot summary of film).
[Vol. 13: p. 103
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ire of their customers.' 2 The film's soundtrack included the song
"100 Miles and Runnin"' ("100 Miles") by the seminal rap group
Niggaz With Attitude ("N.W.A.").13 The song, a dark tale of run-
ning from the law, included a sample from "Get Off Your Ass and
Jam" ("Get Off") by George Clinton, Jr. and the Funkadelics. 14
In 2001, Plaintiffs Bridgeport Music, Southfield, Westbound
Records, and Nine Records brought suit against approximately 800
defendants, among them Dimension Films and No Limit Films.' 5
Plaintiffs Bridgeport and Southfield are music publishers who li-
cense and sell copyrights in musical compositions; the latter plain-
tiffs, Westbound and Nine Records, distribute and produce sound
recordings. 16
The suit revolved around the sampled use of the song "Get
Off."'1 7 Bridgeport and Westbound claimed ownership of the copy-
rights in the musical composition and sound recording, respec-
12. See id. (following plot of film).
13. See generally Stephen Thomas Erlewine, Almusic N. W.A. Biography, http://
www.allmusic.com (search "N.W.A.") (last visited Oct. 14, 2005) (providing biogra-
phy of rap music group). Formed in Los Angeles in 1986, N.W.A. was perhaps one
of the most controversial groups in the history of rap music. See id. I 1 (acknowl-
edging group's public image). Featuring violent lyrics which were politically
charged, N.W.A. gained critical acclaim not only for its lyrical content but also its
sophisticated musical production. See id. 3 (praising musical prowess of group);
see also Jason Birchmeier, Allmusic 100 Miles and Runnin' Review, http://www.
allmusic.com/cg/amg.dll?p=amg&sql=10:osl67ub0h0jh-T1 (last visited Oct. 9,
2005) (critiquing musical work by rap artist N.W.A.). A follow up single to the
group's critically acclaimed album Straight Outta Compton, "100 Miles" "remains one
of the group's best moments ... the song's thick, heavy production showcase[d]
rather brilliantly the fact that [group member] Dr. Dre had furthered his produc-
tion talents immensely." Birchmeier, supra.
14. See N.W.A., 100 Miles and Runnin, on 100 MILES AND RUNNIN' (Ruthless
Records 1990) (reciting lyrics). 100 Miles provided a sinister narrative of a police
pursuit, filled with expletives and violent imagery. See id. (describing lyrical con-
tent of song).
15. See Bridgeport I, 383 F.3d 390, 393 (6th Cir. 2004), amended on reh', 410
F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005) (describing initiation of suit against named defendants).
Originally, the four plaintiffs in this case alleged nearly 500 counts of copyright
infringement and other state intellectual property claims against nearly 800 de-
fendants. See id. (detailing size of original action). Subsequently, the district court
severed that complaint into 476 separate actions, depending on which original
work was allegedly infringed. See id. (recounting procedural history of current
action).
16. See id. (noting intellectual property interests of various plaintiffs in suit).
For a more detailed discussion regarding the applicable copyright law and the dis-
tinction between musical composition and sound recording copyrights, see infra
notes 50-65 and accompanying text.
17. See Bridgeport I, 383 F.3d at 393 (acknowledging plaintiffs' causes of action
regarding song "Get Off").
2006]
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tively. 18 Bridgeport asserted the defendants infringed its copyright
in the musical composition.1 9 The district court eventually dis-
missed these claims, concluding Bridgeport entered into an oral
synchronization license agreement with the musical composition
copyright owners of "100 Miles." 20
Plaintiff Westbound claimed "100 Miles" digitally sampled the
recorded version of "Get Off' without a license, infringing the
sound recording copyright.2 1 According to testimony at trial, "Get
Off' commenced with a three-note guitar solo. 22 The three notes
were not struck simultaneously, but played in rapid succession, a
musical effect known as an "arppeggiated chord."23 The plaintiffs'
expert, Randy Kling, testified that "a two-second sample from the
guitar solo was copied, the pitch was lowered, and the copied piece
was 'looped' 24 and extended to 16 beats."25 The sample appeared
five times in the four-and-a-half minute song; the district court de-
termined each looped sample lasted approximately seven to eight
seconds.26 The repeated loop produced a "high-pitched, whirling
18. See id. (noting plaintiffs' interests in separate copyright claims over song
"Get Off').
19. See id. at 393-94 (stating Bridgeport's copyright interest in underlying mu-
sical work). For a more complete analysis of the difference between musical com-
position and sound recording copyrights, see infra notes 50-65 and accompanying
text.
20. See Bridgeport I, 383 F.3d at 393-94 (noting existence of oral synchroniza-
tion license between Bridgeport and Ruthless Attack Muzick and Dollarz N Sense
Music); see also Bridgeport II, 230 F. Supp. 2d 830, 833-38 (M.D. Tenn. 2002), rev'd,
383 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2005) (determining oral synchronization license existed).
The district court found the oral agreements entered into were valid, and that the
written license agreements, executed subsequently, served to memorialize the ear-
lier agreement between the parties. See Bridgeport II, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 833-38. A
synchronization license refers to a license often used in conjunction with movies,
where a song is used as part of a background for a scene. See DONALD S. PASSMAN,
ALL You NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE MUSIC INDUSTRY 241 (4th ed. 2000) (defining
synchronization license).
21. See Bridgeport 1, 383 F.3d at 394 (specifying plaintiffs varying claims against
various defendants).
22. See id. (noting song structure of "Get Off").
23. See Bridgeport 11, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 839 (describing notes allegedly in-
fringed by defendants); see also Arpeggio, http://www.music.vt.edu/musicdiction-
ary/texta/Arpeggio.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2005) (defining arpeggio and
arpeggiated chord as, "[p]laying the notes of a chord consecutively (harp style). A
broken chord in which the individual notes are sounded one after the other in-
stead of simultaneously").
24. For a discussion of looping as a sampling technique, see infra note 75 and
accompanying text.
25. Bridgeport 1, 383 F.3d at 394.
26. See id. (noting "this sample appears in the sound recording '100 Miles' in
five places; specifically, at 0:49, 1:52, 2:29, 3:20 and 3:46"); see also Birchmeier,
supra note 13 (listing track information). The track "100 Miles" appeared on vari-
[Vol. 13: p. 103
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sound that capture [d] the listener's attention" and created dra-
matic anticipation for the rest of the song.27 No Limit did not dis-
pute that "100 Miles" sampled "Get Off' or included the song on
the film's soundtrack.28
III. BACKGROUND
A) Protection Under Section 106 of the Copyright Act
Copyrights protect "original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression... "29 Section 106 of the Copyright
Act 30 provides that copyrightable subject matter includes at least
eight different categories of creations, including musical works.3'
Copyright holders receive the exclusive right to make copies, to
prepare derivative works, to distribute copies, and to perform or
display the copyrighted work publicly.3 2 In copyright infringement
cases for digital sampling, it is usually necessary to prove the sub-
stantial similarity between the original and allegedly infringing
work.33
ous compilations and albums, each listing one of three running times: 4:32, 4:35,
and 4:37. See Birchmeier, supra note 13.
27. Bridgeport II, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 839.
28. See Bridgeport , 383 F.3d at 393 ("There seems to be no dispute either that
'Get OfF was digitally sampled or that the recording '100 Miles' was included on
the soundtrack .... ").
29. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2005).
30. See id. § 106.
31. See id. (creating exclusive rights in copyright).
32. See id. (listing grant of rights). The applicable portion of Section 106 pro-
vides the right:
1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies of phonorecords;
2) to prepare derivative works based on the copyrighted work;
3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
lending;
4) in the case of literary, musical . . . and other audiovisual works, to
perform the copyrighted work publicly;
a. in the case of literary, musical . . . or other audiovisual work, to
display the copyrighted work publicly; and
b. in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work
publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.
Id.
33. For a more detailed discussion of proving copyright infringement
through similarity, see infra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
2006]
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i) Proving Infringement Via a Similarity of the Works
To successfully prove copyright infringement, a plaintiff must
make a prima facie case showing that they own a valid copyright. 34
Once the plaintiffs have established a valid copyright, they must
also prove the defendant's use of the copyrighted material violates
one of the exclusive rights bestowed upon the holder in Section
106. 35 Success in copyright infringement suits is usually dependent
upon the ability to prove that the defendant has copied a protected
expression, and that the two works are substantially similar.36
Proving unauthorized copying, however, is often difficult be-
cause the plaintiff needs to produce evidence of the actual copy-
ing.3 7 This evidence is usually proven circumstantially and depends
upon a plaintiffs ability to demonstrate the defendant had access
to the original work.38 Evidence of similarity is determined by dis-
tilling the elements that constitute the actual creative expression in
both works, and determining whether the choices made by the de-
fendant were the product of an independently creative process, or
were essentially duplicative of the plaintiffs creative decision-mak-
ing.3 9 While there are many defenses which can be raised to de-
fend infringing uses of copyrighted material, two are pertinent to
the digital sampling discussion. A defendant may 1) assert the use
is small and trivial in the eyes of the law, or 2) the use of the mate-
rial can be considered fair use.40
34. See MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NiMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.01
(1992) (requiring ownership of copyright). Producing a certificate of copyright
issued by the Library of Congress generally establishes a valid copyright and serves
to presumptively demonstrate that a valid copyright exists. See 17 U.S.C. § 410(c)
(2005) (establishing prima facie copyright).
35. See 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2005) (providing requirement for infringement
action).
36. See Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 907 (3d Cir. 1975)
(providing elements of actionable copyright infringement).
37. See Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir.
1976) (citing McGraw-Hill, Inc. v. Worth Publishers, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 415, 419
(S.D.N.Y. 1971)) (requiring plaintiffs to prove ownership of copyright and copying
by defendant).
38. See generally Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946) (providing
analysis for proving violation of exclusive right to reproduce copyrighted mate-
rial). Although many other courts have adopted slightly varying standards, almost
all are based in the standard set forth in Arnstein. See, e.g., Reyher, 533 F.2d at 90
(relying upon standard set in Arnstein).
39. See Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 706, 711
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (expanding test for similarity in unauthorized copying suits).
40. For a discussion of the de minimis use and fair use analyses, see infra notes
41-49 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 13: p. 103
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(1) De Minimis Use Analysis
The de minimis analysis requires that some significant level of
copying must be present, and if "there are no similarities, no
amount of evidence of access will suffice to prove copying."' 4' Un-
less the plaintiff can demonstrate that there is substantial similarity
in the copying, there is no infringement. 42 The analysis addition-
ally examines the amount of the copying taking place. Determin-
ing whether the allegedly infringing work is substantially similar
considers whether the portion copied was at "such a trivial extent as
to fall below the quantitative threshold of substantial similarity,
which is always a required element of actionable copying. ' 43 Thus,
even literal copying is permissible if the amount taken is insignifi-
cant enough to be considered de minimis.44 Nevertheless, should
the court determine that the use is not de minimis and infringing,
the defendant may still assert the fair use defense. 45
(2) The Fair Use Defense
As a matter of policy, courts acknowledge some types of in-
fringement are valid and are a "fair use" of the copyrighted work.46
41. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468.
42. See Mihalek Corp. v. Michigan, 814 F.2d 290, 294 (6th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 986 (1987) (requiring substantial similarity analysis in determining
actionable copyright claims).
43. Ringgold v. Black Entm't Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1997)
(describing de minimis standard).
44. See Warner Bros., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Co., 720 F.2d 231, 242 (2d Cir. 1983)
(holding trivial amounts of copying not actionable); see also West Publ'g Co. v.
Edward Thompson Co., 169 F. 833, 861 (E.D.N.Y. 1909) (stipulating any amount
of copying itself inconclusive to prove infringement).
45. For a more detailed discussion of the fair use defense, see infra notes 46-
49 and accompanying text. It is worth noting the defendants in Bridgeport II did
not assert a fair use defense, as the district court judge did not find that infringe-
ment occurred. See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films (Bridgeport 111), 401
F.3d 647, 651 (6th Cir. 2004) (concluding fair use defense analysis unnecessary at
trial). For a more detailed discussion of how the fair use defense is implicated in
the Sixth Circuit's analysis, see infra notes 177-82 and accompanying text.
46. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2005). The statute provides, in relevant part:
Notwithstanding the provisions of [S]ections 106 and 106A [17
U.S.C. §§ 106 and 106A], the fair use of a copyrighted work, including
such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other
means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment,
news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In deter-
mining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use
the factors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
2006]
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There are several categories of uses of copyrighted material which
are traditionally considered fair uses: scholarship, news reporting,
and parody.47 In addition, courts consider four factors in deciding
whether the use is fair: the purpose and character of the use, the
nature of the copyrighted work, the amount and substantiality of
the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole,
and the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work. 48 The third factor, the amount and substan-
tiality of the portion used, may affect the de minimis analysis - the
smaller the amount used, the more likely courts are to find a fair
use.
49
B) Musical Works are Protected by Two Copyrights
A musical work has two copyrights: one in the underlying mu-
sical work and the other in the actual sound recording.50 The un-
derlying compositions have long been protected by the provisions
of Section 106; a more recent statutory history, however, established
a copyright in the actual sound recording. 5A
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use
if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.
Id.
47. See id. ("[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work ... for purposes such as
criticism, comment . . . scholarship, or research is not an infringement of
copyright.").
48. See id. (specifying considerations in finding fair use).
49. See Andrew Watt, Comment, Parody and Post-Modernism: The Story of Negativ-
land, 25 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 171, 179 (2002) (noting smaller appropriations of
copyrighted work more likely deemed fair use). Watt proposes that a fair use find-
ing for digital samples is likely to be lower, based upon a listener's ability to recog-
nize the original source of a small sample. See id. (asserting split-second James
Brown scream as problematic in fair use analysis).
50. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2),(a)(7) (identifying musical composition and
sound recording copyrights); see alsoJarvis v. A&M Records, 827 F. Supp. 282, 292
(D.N.J. 1993) (noting Copyright Act distinguishes between musical composition
and sound recordings); T.B. Harms Co. v. Jem Records, Inc., 655 F. Supp. 1575,
1576 n.1 (D.N.J. 1987) ("When a copyrighted song is recorded on a phonorecord,
there are two separate copyrights: one on the musical composition and the other
in the sound recording.").
51. For a more detailed discussion of the history and provisions of the sound
recording copyright, see infra notes 56-64 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 13: p. 103
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i) The Theoretical Difference Between the Musical Composition and
Sound Recording Copyright
The copyright in the underlying musical work consists of the
words and music that the author or authors used in creating the
composition's notes, lyrics, and melodies. 52 The sound recording
copyright protects the actual tangible recorded performance of the
musical composition, and the musical choices that were made in
expressing those underlying words and music. 53 For example,
while John Lennon and Paul McCartney own the musical composi-
tion of 'Yesterday," other artists may own their recorded versions of
the song.54 In practice, however, the rights in both the musical
composition and the sound recording are often conveyed to third
parties, such as music publishers and record labels.55
52. See Christopher D. Abramson, Digital Sampling and the Recording Musician:
A Proposal for Legislative Protection, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1660, 1669 (1999) (differentiat-
ing music composition and sound recording copyrights).
53. See id. at 1669-70 (describing sound recording copyright).
54. See id. (illustrating difference between sound recording and music compo-
sition copyrights). The distinction between the sound recording and musical com-
position copyrights can be hard to conceptualize, and John Lennon and Paul
McCartney's "Yesterday" provides a good example:
[T] he Beatles's "Yesterday" is protected by the same musical composition
copyright regardless of how many times it is recorded.
The sound recording copyright... protects one particular recording
of a musical work. Therefore, each different recording of "Yesterday" is
protected by a different sound recording copyright.
Id. at 169; see also Daboub v. Gibbons, 42 F.3d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 1995) (distinguish-
ing copyright between Cole Porter song and Frank Sinatra's recorded version of
song).
55. See Abramson, supra note 52, at 1670 (noting both musical composition
and sound recording copyrights commonly conveyed to third parties). Therefore,
while Paul McCartney and John Lennon composed "Yesterday," it is their publish-
ing company, Northern Songs, which administrates the musical composition copy-
rights. See The Beatles' Companies, http://www.rockmine.music.co.uk/Beatles/
BeatleCo.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2005) (describing Beatles' publishing company).
The Beatles' situation is in some ways unique in that they retained a significant
ownership in their publishing company, Northern Music. See id. (noting publish-
ing company established by Beatles). Similarly, the copyright owners traditionally
assign the rights in the sound recording to a third party, the record company. See
M. WILLAM KRASILOVSKY & SIDNEY SHEMEL, THIS BUSINESS OF Music 28 (8th ed.
2000) (providing record companies often become copyright holders of sound re-
cordings). Today, for example, there are "major labels," a conglomerate of three
to five companies which are considered to be the industry leaders. See PASsMAN,
supra note 20, at 84-85 (describing existence of five "major label" companies).
"Major labels" are named as such due to their extensively staffed departments, and
most importantly, the large distribution channels that they utilize to make their
records available to the public. See id. (indicating organizational structure of large
record companies). There have been numerous consolidations of the major re-
cord companies, and today, four major labels remain: Universal Music Group,
Sony BMG Music Entertainment, Warner Music Group, and EMI Group. See List
2006]
9
Kim: Taking De Minimis out of the Mix: The Sixth Circuit Threatens to
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2006
112 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
ii) The Establishment of the Sound Recording Copyright
Although musical compositions have always enjoyed copyright
protection, prior to 1972, there were no separate copyrights in
sound recordings. 56 Before the enactment of Section 114, under-
ground record pirates directly copied existing records, and then ob-
tained a mechanical compulsory license from the publishers. 57 The
addition of the sound recording copyright created a statutory right
to protect the embodied performance of the music. 5s
Section 114 of the Copyright Act created a separate right in the
actual fixed version of the recording, but limited that right in com-
parison to the provisions of Section 106.5 9 Specifically, Section
114(a) limited sound recording copyright holders to the right to
make copies, the right to create derivative works, and the right to
distribute copies.60 Section 114(b), however, limited the applicable
rights in Section 114(a) to directly recapturing the sounds already
of Record Labels, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List-of recordlabels (last visited
Oct. 12, 2005) (listing major labels).
Continuing with the Beatles for illustrative purposes, the sound recording
copyright to Help!, the album on which the song "Yesterday" first appeared, has
changed hands, and is currently owned by Capitol Records, while the music com-
position copyright has remained with Northern Songs. See, e.g., William
Ruhlmann, Help! (US) Overview, http://www.allmusic.com/cg/amg.dll?p=amg&
sql=10:pxoibkk96akz (last visited Oct. 9, 2005) (providing information regarding
Beatles' record). Capitol Records retained the sound recording copyright owner
of The Beatles' album Help! since its original release in 1965. See id. (detailing
sound recording owner of Beatles's album).
56. See PASSMAN, supra note 20, at 308-09 (describing history of sound record-
ing copyright).
57. See id. (crediting underground record piracy as impetus for creation of
sound recording copyright). The mechanical compulsory license enables anyone
to record a non-dramatic musical work once the owner of the copyrighted owner
distributes phonorecords of the work. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2005) (creat-
ing compulsory license). Congress originally created this mandatory license in re-
sponse to the rise of the piano roll and phonorecord industry. See Theresa M.
Bevilacqua, Note, Time to Say Good-Bye to Madonna's American Pie: Why Mechanical
Compulsory Licensing Should be Put to Rest, 19 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 285, 289
(2001) (recounting history of mechanical compulsory licenses). Currently, com-
pulsory licenses are more commonly thought of as the device through which artists
obtain a mandatory license to the musical composition copyright in order to create
"cover" songs of other artists' works. See id. at 286 (crediting mechanical compul-
sory license with bestowing right to cover another artist's works).
58. See PASSMAN, supra note 20, at 310 (describing sound recording copyright
protection).
59. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(a) (2005) (limiting sound recording copyright to se-
lected clauses from Section 106).
60. See id. (delineating provisions of sound recording copyrights). Section
114(a) provides that, "[t]he exclusive rights of the owner of copyright in a sound
recording are limited to the rights specified by clauses (1), (2), (3) and (6) of
section 106 . . ." Id.
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held in the fixed form. 6 1 Therefore, the rights under Section
114(b) did "not extend to the making or duplication of another
sound recording that consists entirely of an independent fixation of
other sounds, even though such sounds imitate or simulate those in
the copyrighted sound recording."62 The owner of a particular ver-
sion of a record could only bring an infringement action if they
could prove that at least some substantial segment of the original
sound recording had been copied.6 3 Thus, Congress designed the
Sound Recording Act to provide protection of the actual unique
performance captured, not the underlying music. 64 Because digital
sampling typically copies and manipulates the actual sound record-
ing, it is important to understand its history and use in modern
music.
6 5
C) The Rich Tradition of Sampling the Musical Composition
The concept of taking another composer's musical composi-
tion and transposing it to a new piece of music is not a recent phe-
nomenon. 66 Classical composers and artists have traditionally used
61. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (stipulating exclusive sound recording copyright
for fixed version). The statute, in relevant part, provides:
The exclusive right of the owner of copyright in a sound recording
under clause (1) of section 106 [17 U.S.C. § 106] is limited to the right to
duplicate the sound recording in the form of phonorecords or copies
that directly or indirectly recapture the actual sounds fixed in the record-
ing. The exclusive right of the owner of copyright in a sound recording
under clause (2) of section 106 [17 U.S.C. § 106] is limited to the right to
prepare a derivative work in which the actual sounds fixed in the sound
recording are rearranged, remixed, or otherwise altered in sequence or
quality. The exclusive rights of the owner of copyright in a sound record-
ing under clauses (1) and (2) of section 106 [17 U.S.C. § 106] do not
extend to the making or duplication of another sound recording that
consists entirely of an independent fixation of other sounds, even though




63. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 106 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5721 (requiring copying of substantial portion).
64. See id. ("Mere imitation of a recorded performance would not constitute a
copyright infringement even where one performer deliberately sets out to simulate
another's performance as exactly as possible.").
65. For a discussion of digital sampling and its usage of sound recordings, see
infra notes 69-81 and accompanying text.
66. See Josh Norek, Comment, "You Can't Sing Without the Bling" The Toll of
Excessive Sample License Fees on Creativity in Hip-Hop Music and the Need for a Compul-
sory Sound Recording Sample License System, 11 UCLA ENT. L. REv. 83, 95 (2004)
("Since the beginning of Western music, musicians have liberally referenced works
by other musicians."). Norek notes that while hip-hop receives more scrutiny
under copyright law, artists in the genres of rock and roll and classical music have
long borrowed from other musical sources. See id. (asserting increased scrutiny for
20061
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motifs and melodies from other composers, or have directly lifted
passages note-for-note into their own works.67 This practice is de
rigeur for jazz artists performing improvised solos, also known as
"quoting."68
i) The Innovation of Sampling the Sound Recording
Previously, musicians sampled by crudely re-recording sections
of analog tapes. 69 The sound quality was often poor, and the ana-
log storage medium did not allow for much manipulation of the
source sounds.70 Advances to digital technology enables sounds to
be precisely and accurately sampled without degradation of sound
quality as well as providing greater flexibility in terms of manipulat-
ing the source sounds, making sampling an extremely attractive op-
tion.71  Rap music particularly benefited from advances in
sampling, as artists unable to afford backing musicians, could now
hip-hop music). Norek identifies several artists such as the Red Hot Chili Peppers,
whose song "Punk Rock Classic" makes use of a guitar riff from Guns N' Roses
"Sweet Child 0' Mine." See id. at n.65 (identifying guitar riff utilized from other
artist's work).
67. See Sherri Carl Hampel, Note, Are Samplers Getting a Bum Rap?: Copyright
Infringement or Technological Creativity?, 1992 U. ILL. L. REv. 559, 584 (1992) (illus-
trating use of sampling in classical music).
68. See Sean Singer, Velocity of Celebration: Jazz and Semiotics, (Feb. 1997), http:/
/www.allaboutjazz.com/articles/ae0297_01.htm (describing importance of quot-
ing in jazz). Quoting is important to jazz music for its effect upon the listener, with
musicians playing:
[A]nything from Thelonious Monk's Well You Needn't to Scott Joplin's
"The Entertainer" to a familiar line from the Broadway tune "Gonna
Wash That Man Right Outta My Hair." Thad Jones once quoted "Pop
Goes The Weasel" in a solo on "April In Paris." The tone color, phrasing,
and energy can be detected by certain members of the audience who
general [sic] shout, applaud, or laugh.
Id.
69. SeeJohnson, supra note 2, at 139 (describing early sampling). The practice
of sampling using analog tapes can be traced back to the "musique concrete" style,
developed by French artists, who would create musical collages by cutting and
splicing pre-recorded tapes in their music. See id.
70. See id. (noting sound quality improvements via digital technology). Dur-
ing the 1960s, musicians used the Mellotron, an early incarnation of the synthe-
sizer, which used tape loops to recreate sounds. See id. The Mellotron differs from
digital sampling in that it stored the sounds as magnetic fluctuations on standard
audio tape, as opposed to the series of numbers used in digital sampling. See id.
71. See id. (claiming sampling creates greater opportunities to manipulate
sounds as well as save costs). With the technological advances in sampling:
The combination of a sampler and a multi-track tape recorder essentially
grants musicians access to an entire orchestra, including brass and per-
cussion, with only minimal investment. This technology makes large, ex-
pensive studio sessions unnecessary and places today's most popular
instrumental sounds at the musician's fingertips.
Id. at 139-40 (footnote omitted).
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simply sample backing tracks from pre-existing recordings. 72 While
some artists did in fact clear samples with the sound recording and
music composition copyright holders, many more adopted a "catch
me if you can" attitude, sampling freely in the hopes that potential
litigants would either remain unaware their works were being used,
or would not bring suit. 73
ii) Digital Sampling Allows for a Wide Range of Uses
In modern music, sampling takes an actual segment of a sound
recording or musical composition from a pre-existing work.7 4 Musi-
cians typically manipulate samples, with the length of the sample
and the extent of the manipulation varying in each use. 75 The abil-
ity of the listener, therefore, to recognize the sample may turn on
several factors: the length and distinctiveness being among the
most prevalent. 76 Some rap songs intentionally take longer, recog-
72. See Abramson, supra note 52, at 1668 (claiming "[sampling] allows a pro-
ducer of music to save money (by not hiring a musician) without sacrificing the
sound and phrasing of a live musician in the song.").
73. See Bridgeport I, 383 F.3d 390, 401 (6th Cir. 2004), amended on reh'g, 410
F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting prevalent "live and let live" attitude regarding
infringing sampling); see also PASSmAN, supra note 20, at 306-07 ("... artists and
[record] companies often had an attitude along the lines of 'If they catch me, I'll
make a deal."').
74. See Williams v. Broadus, No. 99 Civ. 10957 (MBM), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12894, at *2 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2001) (describing sampling method used by
musicians). Sampling, as described in Broadus, is "lifting part of a song from a pre-
existing master recording and feeding it through a digital sampler, or by hiring
musicians who re-play or re-sing portions of the pre-existing composition." Id.
75. See KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 55, at 77 (describing sampling).
For example, in Bridgeport, the three-note sample was manipulated by "looping."
See Bridgeport I, 383 F.3d 390, 394 (6th Cir. 2004), amended on reh', 410 F.3d 792
(6th Cir. 2005) (describing sample). Looping is a sampling technique in which a
segment of music, also known as a "riff," is converted into a digital data file, and
then sequenced in a repetitive manner. See Achenbach, supra note 1, at 201-02
(defining looping as "using a particular 'riff from the original song consisting of
several notes. The riff is sampled by conversion to a digital data file, which is then
sequenced in a repetitive manner to create a rhythm track").
76. See generally Robert M. Szymanski, Audio Pastiche: Digital Sampling, Intermedi-
ate Copying, Fair Use, 3 UCLA ENT. L. Rv. 271 (1996) (asserting several factors
present in manipulation of samples). Szymanski notes that some samples are rec-
ognizable because they use a known, familiar song in a new context, or because the
sample itself has been used often by other artists. See id. at 279 (citing David
Sanjek, "Don't Have to DJ No More". Sampling and the "Autonomous" Creator, 10 CAR-
DOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 607, 613 (1992)) (postulating basis for listener's ability to
recognize sample's source). For example, Run D.M.C.'s "Walk this Way" chal-
lenges listeners to consider Aerosmith's original music in an entirely new manner.
See id. (providing example of transformative sampling). Szymanski further notes
that although James Brown's "Funky Drummer" was only a minor hit when origi-
nally released, it is easily recognized today due to the widespread sampling of
Clyde Stubblefield's drumming performance. See id. at n.32 (noting drumbeat
2006]
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nizable samples. The first breakthrough hit of rap music was The
Sugar Hill Gang's "Rapper's Delight,"77 which made a very obvious
use of a sample from Chic's "Good Times."'78 While the original
source of a quantitatively long sample may be easier to identify, this
is not always the case. 79 A very short howl by James Brown may be
immediately recognizable due to its qualitative distinctiveness. 80 In
contrast, other groups, such as Public Enemy, relied on production
techniques which also included samples, but which were so short
and distorted that the original source was unrecognizable to the
listener.81 In cases where the sampling is relatively small, the courts
have utilized the de minimis use analysis in determining if actionable
infringement has taken place.
iii) Judicial Interpretation of De Minimis Use in Sampling
The de minimis use analysis regarding sampling is a relatively
new and unsettled area of law. 82 In Newton v. Diamond,83 the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals held the use of a three-note flute solo in
the Beastie Boys' "Pass the Mic" did not rise to the level of an in-
fringing use, because the use of the composition, and not the actual
performance, was de minimis.84 In Newton, the Ninth Circuit em-
"sampled by various artists including Sinead O'Connor, Fine Young Cannibals...
and Public Enemy").
77. THE SUGAR HILL GANG, Rapper's Delight, on RAPPER'S DELIGHT (Sugar Hill
Records 1979).
78. CHIC, Good Times, on RIsQuE (Atlantic Records 1979).
79. See PAssNAN, supra note 20, at 306 (describing use of samples in songs).
The length of the samples is often inconsequential to whether the listener is able
to easily recognize the artist or the original work. See id.
80. See id. (providing examples of recognizable samples). For example, James
Brown's music is some of the most frequently sampled in rap music, and much of
the sampled pieces are easily recognizable to most of the listening public. See id.
(assertingJames Brown's music is commonly sampled in rap music). In addition,
there appears to be a larger "wholesale lifting" of music for rap songs today. See id.
(noting Robbie Williams song "Millennium" utilizes "You Only Live Twice" as un-
derlying musical backbone).
81. See Public Enemy: Bio, http://www.mtv.com/bands/az/public-enemy/
bio.jhtml, (last visited Oct. 9, 2005) (distinguishing Public Enemy's production
style). Public Enemy influenced the development of rap music, both lyrically and
sonically. See id. I1 (crediting Public Enemy as rap innovators). Their production
team, the Bomb Squad, earned critical praise for splicing samples to a degree
where they were unrecognizable to any listener, creating "dense soundscapes that
relied on avant-garde cut-and-paste techniques, unrecognizable samples, piercing
sirens, relentless beats, and deep funk." Id.
82. See Bridgeport I, 383 F.3d 390, 400 (6th Cir. 2004), amended on reh'g, 410
F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005) (acknowledging scarcity of legal precedent in determin-
ing appropriate analysis).
83. 349 F.3d 591 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2905 (2005).
84. See id. at 598 (holding musical composition use de minimis and not actiona-
ble). Newton is factually distinguishable from Bridgeport because in Newton the de-
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ployed two methodologies in assessing whether there was substan-
tial similarity between a secondary work and the sampled piece of
music. 85 First, the court found that the "fragmented literal similar-
ity" analysis required an additional inquiry as to the question of sub-
stantial similarity between the two works.86  Next, the court
considered whether qualitatively or quantitatively, that substantially
similar use fell below a de minimis level. 87
The court characterized Newton's infringement claim as one
requiring a fragmented literal similarity because the Beastie Boys
copied an exact or nearly exact piece of the plaintiff's work, without
copying the overall structure of the prior work.88 The Ninth Circuit
held that cases classified as fragmented literal similarity presumed
the copying resulted in a significant actual similarity between the
works.8 9 Therefore, the court determined it necessary to further
analyze whether the similar pieces were trivial or substantial in that
similarity.90
The substantiality of the similarity between the two works "is
measured by considering the qualitative and quantitative signifi-
cance of the copied portion in relation to the plaintiffs work as a
whole." 91 The court noted that the sampled portion was not quali-
tatively significant to the plaintiffs work, as the three-note sequence
fendants obtained the license for the sound recording of "Choir," a song written
and performed by avant-garde jazz flutistJames Newton. See id. at 592 (recounting
facts of case). The Beastie Boys licensed the right to "Choir" from ECM, the sound
recording copyright owner, but the composition copyright remained with Newton.
See id. at 592-93 (providing details regarding copyright ownership). Newton sued
on the basis that the musical composition copyright had been violated. See id. (stat-
ing basis of plaintiffs claim).
85. See Bridgeport II, 230 F. Supp. 2d 830, 841 (M.D. Tenn. 2002), rev'd, 383
F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2005) (acknowledging two categories of legal analysis regarding
de minimis analysis).
86. See id. (noting judicial reliance upon Nimmer's "fragmented literal simi-
larity" analysis (referencing NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03 [A] [2] at 13-45,
n.92.2)).
87. See id. (identifying quantitative/qualitative appropriation analysis).
88. See Newton, 349 F.3d at 596 (applying fragmented literal similarity
analysis).
89. See id. (explaining presumption of high similarity).
90. See id. (breaking down trivial and substantial elements analysis).
91. Id. (citing Worth v. Selchow & Righter Co., 827 F.2d 569, 570 n.1 (9th Cir.
1987)). The correct analysis is to determine whether the substantial portion was
appropriated from the plaintiff's work. See id. (citing Worth, 827 F.2d at 570 n.1)
(detailing correct standard application); see also Jarvis v. A&M Records, 827 F.
Supp. 282, 291 (D.N.J. 1993) (defining "constituent elements of the work that are
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only appeared once in the song for a mere six seconds. 92 Further,
the court held that qualitatively, the musical interval in the three-
note sequence appeared in a variety of forms throughout the com-
position.93 The court concluded the value of Newton's contribu-
tion was in the performance, and therefore, the actual similarity
between the compositions was de minimis as there was no substantial
similarity.94 The Newton case revolved around the de minimis stan-
dard as applied to musical composition copyright infringement,
and not in actions based upon sound recording copyright infringe-
ment.9 5 The analytical tools of the Newton case, however, formed
the basis of the district court's holding in Bridgeport I.
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
A) The District Court Decision
At trial, defendant No Limit Films ("No Limit") moved for
summary judgment on the basis that the digitally sampled chord
from the unlicensed sound recording did not meet the requisite
level of originality, and therefore, was not copyrightable. 96 No
Limit argued further that even if a valid copyright did exist, that the
use of the sample from "Get Off' was de minimis, and therefore, not
actionable.97 The district court found that the originality of the
sampled music could be analyzed by the way in which the notes
were used and their effect upon the listener, rather than the origi-
nality of the actual notes.98 The court found that a reasonable jury
92. See Newton, 349 F.3d at 597 (determining sequence comprised only two
percent of original work). The three-note sequence lasted for approximately six
seconds out of the four and a half minute licensed sound recording. See id. (calcu-
lating quantitative significance of sequence).
93. See id. (concluding Newton failed to establish sampled section's particular
significance in original composition).
94. See id. at 598 (concluding composition use was de minimis). The court
particularly noted that on the facts of the case, a listener would be unable to recog-
nize Newton's contribution as a composer, separate from his talent as a performer.
See id.
95. See Bridgeport I, 383 F.3d 390, 396 (6th Cir. 2004), amended on reh'g, 410
F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005) (concluding sound recording requires different analysis
than that for musical composition).
96. See id. at 394 (explaining No Limit Films' argument for summary judg-
ment); see also Bridgeport II, 230 F. Supp. 2d 830, 839 (M.D. Tenn. 2002), rev'd,
383 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2005) (providing elements of composition only extend to
parts original to author) (citing Quinn v. City of Detroit, 23 F. Supp. 2d 741, 746-
47 (E.D. Mich. 1998)).
97. See Bridgeport I, 383 F.3d at 394 (asserting "the sample was legally insub-
stantial and therefore does not amount to actionable copying under copyright
law").
98. See Bridgeport II, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 839 (describing originality requirement
analysis for copyrightable element).
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could conclude that the chord appeared in an original way and was
"therefore entitled to copyright protection."99
Turning to the question of de minimis use, the district court
determined that based upon either a qualitative/quantitative de
minimis analysis, or the fragmented literal similarity test, the use of
the sample in question did not rise to the level of an infringing
use.100 The district court found that under each method of analy-
sis, the de minimis standard was a "derivation of the substantial simi-
larity element," and that therefore, the key question was whether
the average listener would be able to discern the original source of
the sampled recording.10 1 After listening to both "Get Off' and
"100 Miles," the court found that no reasonable juror, even one
familiar with George Clinton's music, could have known the origi-
nal source without having been told.'0 2
Additionally, the court found that the small amount of actual
copying, as well as the actual difference between the songs, sup-
ported a finding of no copyright infringement.10 3 Balancing the
need of artists to use existing music to create new works, and noting
that the purpose of copyright law was to "deter wholesale plagiarism
of prior works[,]" the court granted No Limit's motion to dismiss
Westbound's sound recording infringement claim. 10 4 Westbound
appealed to the Sixth Circuit, challenging the district court's usage
99. Id.
100. See Bridgeport 1, 383 F.3d at 395 (concluding use was de minimis and not
actionable).
101. Bridgeport II, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 841 (deriving de minimis analysis from
substantial similarity analysis).
102. See Bridgeport I, 383 F.3d at 395 (finding reasonable user could not recog-
nize sample "Get Off" unless informed).
103. See id. ("This finding, coupled with findings concerning the quantita-
tively small amount of copying involved and the lack of qualitative similarity be-
tween the works, led the district court to conclude that Westbound could not
prevail on its claims for copyright infringement of the sound recording."); see also
Bridgeport I, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 841-42 (detailing district court analysis). The dis-
trict court determined that each looped segment lasted seven or eight seconds,
and that only 40 seconds out of the total four and a half minute length of "Get
Off" used the sample. See Bridgeport II, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 841 (determining total
use of sample in relation to length of song). In addition, the court found that the
actual mood of "Get Off' was "celebratory, and meant to instill a positive feeling in
the listener, whereas '100 Miles' was a dark and brooding piece, in which the 'Get
Off' sample created additional "tension and apprehension at the sound of pursu-
ing law enforcement." Id. at 841-42.
104. Bridgeport II, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 842-43 (dismissing Westbound's sound
recording infringement claim). The court concluded that because musical bor-
rowing was an essential element of creating new works, that "[i]f even an aficio-
nado of George Clinton's music might not readily ascertain that his music has
been borrowed, the purposes of copyright law would not be served by punishing
the borrower for his creative use." Id.
2006]
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of the de minimis copyright infringement analysis in determining
that its claims were not actionable. 10 5
B) Reversal by the Sixth Circuit
In a unanimous decision, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's decision, disagree-
ing with the lower court's analysis. 1° 6 The Sixth Circuit accepted
Westbound's claim that neither a substantial similarity nor a de
minimis analysis were appropriate because No Limit Films did not
dispute that it digitally sampled the sound recording of "Get
Off.'10 7 Indeed, the court concluded that use of the substantial
similarity analysis for musical composition infringement was not
proper when dealing with sound recording infringement, and that
the creation of a new rule was necessary.108 The court based its
conclusion upon the statutory language of the Copyright Act, and
its interpretation of the sound recording copyright holders as abso-
lute.109 Further, policy concerns demanded something approach-
105. See Bridgeport 1, 383 F.3d at 393 (describing grounds for Westbound's ap-
peal). Bridgeport Music also appealed the district court's decision, not on the
basis of the summaryjudgment regarding its oral synchronization license, but in its
attempt to "amend the complaint to assert new claims of infringement based on a
different song included in the sound track of Hook Up." Id.
106. See id. (disagreeing with district court analysis). In granting summary
judgment, the court reviewed the case de novo. See id. (citing Smith v. Ameritech,
12 F.3d 857, 863 (6th Cir. 1997)) (providing standard of review). "In deciding a
motion for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence and [all] reason-
able inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Id. (citing
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)) (artic-
ulating basis for granting summary judgment). If there are no genuine issues of
material fact, the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
See FED R. Civ. P. 56(c) (articulating basis of summary judgment standard).
107. See Bridgeport 1, 383 F.3d at 395 (articulating plaintiff Westbound's claim
on appeal).
108. See id. at 396 n.4 (acknowledging "dearth of legal authority" dealing with
sound recording copyright infringement). The court concluded that if a musical
composition copyright had been at issue, its analysis would have followed the dis-
trict court's analysis, but because a sound recording was at issue, its analysis dif-
fered. See id. at 396 (claiming district court analysis proper for music composition
copyright infringement). In addition, the court noted that it would have agreed
with the district court's analysis regarding the originality of the arpeggiated chord
sampled from "Get Off' had the musical composition been at issue. See id. (con-
curring with originality analysis). In the case of sound recordings, however, the
actual fixation of the sounds in the master recording satisfied the originality re-
quirement. See id. (holding actual fixation of sounds constituted original
expression).
109. See id. (specifying statutory language of Copyright Act formed basis of
reasoning).
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ing a bright-line, benefiting other courts and creating a more
efficient marketplace for copyright clearances.110
i) The Sixth Circuit's Statutory Analysis
The court asserted that their "analysis begins and largely ends"
with Section 114 of the Copyright Act."' Based upon the history of
the statute, the creation of a separate right for the protection of
sound recordings demonstrated the intentional creation of distinct
and different rights from musical compositions. 112 Further, citing
the actual statutory language of Section 114, the court asserted that
the sound recording copyright holders enjoyed an absolute right to
their musical work."13
Looking at the history of the Copyright Act, the court acknowl-
edged that the overall purpose of copyright law centered upon giv-
ing protection to a creator's work without stifling further
creativity."a 4 The musical composition copyright regime reinforced
this determination, as artists could protect their own content from
being copied, but could not exclusively control their works or
"fence them off from the world at large."' '15 The court interpreted
the creation of the sound recording copyright as giving an exclusive
right for the copyright holder, as other artists could imitate the cre-
ative content of the musical work via a compulsory license, but
could not duplicate the original work.116 Therefore, if one could
not copy the sound recording for an entire work, the court con-
cluded that it could not copy something less than the whole, with-
out infringing the sound recording copyright. 117
Based on this history, the court attempted to adopt a literal
interpretation of the statutory language. 118 The court determined
that Section 114 specified the exclusive rights in Section 106 for the
110. See id. ("The music industry, as well as the courts, are best served if some-
thing approximating a bright-line test can be established.").
111. Id.
112. See Bridgeport I, 383 F.3d at 397 (examining statutory history of Section
114).
113. See id. (stating court's analysis).
114. See id. at 398 (recognizing policy balancing promoting creativity with pro-
tecting works).
115. Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 115).
116. See id. ("It must be remembered that if an artist wants to incorporate a
'riftF from another work in his or her recording, he is free to duplicate the sound
of that 'rif' in the studio.").
117. See Bridgeport I, 383 F.3d at 398 (concluding only copyright owner has
right to sample own work without license).
118. See id. at 401 ("[T]here is no Rosetta stone for the interpretation of the
copyright statute. We have taken a 'literal reading' approach.").
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owner of the sound recording: the right to make copies, the right to
prepare derivative works, the right to distribute copies, and to per-
form the work via digital audio transmission.' 19 Further, because
the original 1971 Sound Recording Amendment was enacted to
protect against the technological advances, which at that time ena-
bled record pirating, Section 114(b) gave the sound recording
copyright holder an exclusive right to duplicate the sound record-
ing. 120 Analyzing Section 114(b), the court held the exclusive right
of the sound recording copyright holder to prepare derivative
works under Section 106 applied in situations where artists manipu-
lated the actual sounds fixed in the recording.12' While an artist
could feel free to duplicate the notes and sounds in the recording,
to directly lift the sample without a license constituted a per se in-
fringing use. 122
ii) The Sixth Circuit's Policy Analysis
The court found that policy determinations also supported es-
tablishing a bright-line rule. First, the court found that a "license or
do not sample" standard would create easy enforcement and help
promote a self-regulating market for sampling clearance licenses.' 23
Although this rule would allow for greater judicial economy in de-
ciding sampling cases, the court disputed that this was their primary
rationale in rejecting the de minimis use analysis, deeming sampling
as not only an intellectual taking, but as an actual physical
misappropriation. 124
Concluding that an artist's decision to sample is always inten-
tional, the court determined that sampling the sound recording
without a license was per se an infringing use.125 By establishing a
bright-line rule for sound recording infringement, the court con-
tended there would be easier enforcement of copyright law and
that the rule would not stifle creativity.1 26 Under this ruling, artists
wishing to use the section of an existing recording could simply
119. See id. at 397 (determining Section 114(a) provided basis for rights of
sound recording copyright holder).
120. See id. at 398 (noting policy behind creation of sound recording
copyright).
121. See id. (interpreting sound recording copyright).
122. See Bridgeport I, 383 F.3d at 398 (concluding artist cannot sample an-
other's work without license).
123. Id. at 398-99 (elucidating need for bright-line rule).
124. See id. at 399 (analogizing digital sampling as physical taking).
125. See id. (determining sampling always intentional).
126. See id. at 396 ("We do not see this as stifling creativity in any significant
way.").
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recreate the desired piece of music in the studio. 127 In instances
where the artist did not want to recreate the music for either crea-
tive or financial reasons, obtaining a license would be necessary. By
adopting this rule, the court posited that the digital sample licens-
ing market would benefit significantly as internal market controls
would establish more uniform licensing fees, and set limits upon
such fees. 128 Theorizing that the sound recording owner could not
exact a license fee greater than the actual cost of recreating the
sounds, the court's holding would assist in setting boundaries upon
the fees exacted by the sound recording owners. 129
Aside from the statutory analysis and the market interests in-
volved, the court also determined that theoretically, taking three
notes of a sound recording no matter how small, took something of
value from the copyright owner. 130 An inquiry into how much or
the intent behind the sampling is irrelevant. 131 For the owner of
the sound recording copyright, the value of the copyright was not
in the notes, but in the sounds which were fixed in the record-
ing.1 32 Therefore, the taking was not intellectual, but rather a phys-
ical taking. 133 To adopt a de minimis or substantial similarity
standard for digital sampling would require "mental, musicological,
and technological gymnastics," the kind of which the court believed
would result in an inefficient music economy. 34
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
A) Bridgeport's Elimination of the De Minimis Standard Results in
Problems Greater than its Potential Benefit
While the Sixth Circuit's elimination of the de minimis excep-
tion for sound recording copyrights increases judicial economy and
ease of enforcement, the court's ruling is problematic in its statu-
127. See Bridgeport I, 383 F.3d at 399 (noting artists' ability to recreate sounds).
128. See id. (determining bright-line ruling will result in more uniform digital
sample licensing market).
129. See id. at 398-99 (suggesting "copyright holder[s] cannot exact a license
fee greater than what it would cost the person seeking the license to just duplicate
the sample in the course of making the new recording.").
130. See id. at 399 ("[E]ven when a small part of a sound recording is sampled,
the part taken is something of value.").
131. See id. ("No further proof of that is necessary than the fact that the pro-
ducer of the record or the artist on the record intentionally sampled because it
would (1) save costs, or (2) add something to the new recording, or (3) both.").
132. See Bridgeport I, 383 F.3d at 399 ("[I] t is not the 'song' but the sounds that
are fixed in the medium of choice.").
133. See id. (characterizing different theoretical basis for reasoning).
134. Id. (justifying non-application of de minimis analysis).
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tory interpretation as well as its policy justifications. 3 5 By taking
Section 114 as the guiding statute, the court misinterprets the statu-
tory analysis indicating that the creation of the sound recording
copyright still required an evaluation of the substantial similarity of
the original and allegedly infringing works. 136 In addition, the
court miscalculates both its policy analysis likening sampling to a
physical taking, as well as its assumption that eliminating a de
minimis use analysis will help to establish a self-regulating license
market. 137
i) A Critique of the Sixth Circuit's Statutory Analysis
First, the court engages in an improper analysis of the actual
statutory language as well as ignoring the legislative history of Sec-
tion 114.138 The court interpreted Section 114's provision regard-
ing the right to create derivative works as prohibiting sampling of
the sound recording by anyone other than the copyright owner. 139
It appears, however, Section 114 actually stipulates that the sound
recording copyright owner is "limited" in sampling the actual fixed
copy of the work. 140 Therefore, Section 114 does not operate as an
additional or stronger right; it must be read as a limitation upon
the more general provisions of Section 106, which includes the sub-
stantial similarity analysis in proving infringement. 141
Furthermore, the legislative history of Section 114 also indi-
cates that Congress envisioned the substantial similarity analysis
should be included in analyzing sound recording copyright in-
fringement. 142 While the court determined that the de minimis use
analysis was applicable to music composition copyrights, it asserted
135. For a critique of the Sixth Circuit's statutory and policy analysis, see infra
notes 138-61 and accompanying text.
136. For a critique of the Sixth Circuit's statutory analysis, see infra notes 138-
45 and accompanying text.
137. For a critique of the Sixth Circuit's policy analysis, see infra notes 146-61
and accompanying text.
138. See Recent Case: Copyright Law - Sound Recording Act - Sixth Circuit Rejects
De Minimis to the Infringement of a Sound Recording Copyright. - Bridgeport Music,
Inc. v. Dimension Films, 383 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2004), 118 HARv. L. REv. 1355, 1359
(2005) [hereinafter Recent Case] ("Although the court in Bridgeport Music relied
heavily on the copyright statute to justify its holding, nothing in the statute's his-
tory or language requires that a substantial-similarity inquiry not apply to a sound
recording copyright.").
139. See id. (proposing court's reading of statutory language was incorrect).
140. See id. (critiquing court's analysis of Section 114).
141. See id. (concluding Section 114 does not create additional or stronger
right).
142. See id. at 1359-60 (averring court did not consider history of Section
114).
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sound recordings required a separate analysis. 14 The court rea-
soned that because digital sampling was not at issue in 1971, it was
difficult to discern the legislative intent in creating the sound re-
cording copyright. 144 Although Congress may not have anticipated
the emergence of digital sampling, it did believe that the copying of
"any substantial portion of the actual sounds" constituted
infringement. 145
ii) A Critique of the Sixth Circuit's Policy Analysis
By likening the taking of a digital sample to an actual physical
taking, the court misconstrued the nature of sampling. 46 An ami-
cus brief argued that "digital sampling is the creation of a copy, not
the seizure of the original sound.' 47 Thus, digital sampling leaves
the original sound recording intact, much like photocopying a
book creates a copy without destroying the original. 148 Catego-
rizing digital sampling as a physical taking does not create a mean-
ingful basis upon which sound recordings deserve greater copyright
protection. 149 Therefore, because digital samples cannot be rea-
sonably construed as physical takings, the Sixth Circuit's conclusion
categorizing them as such does not follow.
Secondly, the court assumes that potential samplers have simi-
lar motivations in attaching value to samples, and incorrectly as-
sumes some market equilibrium will follow. 150 The court proposes
that because an artist has the option to recreate the sounds in the
studio and obtain a mechanical compulsory license, it will prevent
copyright holders from exacting a license fee greater than the cost
143. See Bridgeport I, 383 F.3d 390, 396 (6th Cir. 2004), amended on rehg, 410
F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005) (concluding infringement analysis of musical composition
copyright varies from analysis for sound recording infringement).
144. See id. at 401-02 ("The legislative history is of little help because digital
sampling wasn't being done in 1971.").
145. Recent Case, supra note 138, at 1359-60 (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at
107 (1976)) (italics omitted).
146. See Bridgeport I, 383 F.3d at 399 (proposing sampling "is a physical taking
rather than an intellectual one").
147. Brief of Amici Curiae Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law
and The Electronic Frontier Foundation in Support of Appellee at 10, Bridgeport
Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 383 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2004) (No. 02-6521).
148. See id. (analogizing digital sampling to photocopies of books).
149. See id. (proposing "[a] distinction between physical and intellectual tak-
ing . .. is not meaningful and does not distinguish copying of sound recordings
from many other types of copying").
150. See Bridgeport 1, 383 F.3d at 401 (concluding recording industry and re-
cording artists possess ability to create meaningful guidelines for licensing).
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of simply re-recording the desired music. 15 1 The court overlooks
what the sampler wishes to obtain - the original and unique ex-
pression of the notes.1 52 In some cases, the musical composition
may be of secondary interest, as the actual composition is manipu-
lated.' 53 What is of value to the sampler is the unique nature of the
original recorded sounds and the creative choices that were made
in the actual fixation of the composition.154 In Newton, the court
deemed that it was the actual embodied performance of the music
that contained the value, not simply the configuration of a particu-
lar combination of notes. 155
Finally, the assumption that the Sixth Circuit's holding will fa-
cilitate the creation of a sample license market ignores the reality of
the current market failure. 156 In some instances, because both par-
ties recognize it is a particular version of the song that an artist
wishes to sample in creating a secondary work, the copyright owner
will be able to exact a fee much higher than the cost of recreating
the sounds in the studio.157 Further, the possibility remains that
151. See id. at 398-99 (asserting license holders' inability to obtain excessive
fees).
152. See Recent Case, supra note 138, at 1362 (recognizing "sampling the
sounds creates an expression the musician may not otherwise be able to
articulate").
153. See id. Samples may be manipulated in order to change their pitch,
rhythm, and overall feel. See, e.g., Bridgeport II, 230 F. Supp. 2d 830, 838-39 (M.D.
Tenn. 2002), rev'd, 383 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2005) (depicting manipulation of
sample).
154. See Newton v. Diamond, 349 F.3d 591, 595 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied,
125 S. Ct. 2905 (2005) (determining value of sample is embodied in artists' per-
formance); see also Szymanski, supra note 76, at 272 (citing Steven Dupler, Digital
Sampling: Is it Theft? Technology Raises Copyright Question, BILLBOARD, Aug. 2, 1986, at
74) (asserting musicians desire particular samples). Producer/remixer Freddie
Bastone notes:
In some cases, you use a sample because its [sic] a really unique sound
you want and it would be impossible to get otherwise, like [John] Bon-
ham's kick drum [from the Led Zeppelin album "Houses of the Holy"]
.... [You] could probably, with a lot of setup and experimentation, get
the sound you are after. But it is so much faster to use a sample."
Szymanski, supra note 76, at 272 (alterations in original) (citing Dupler, supra, at
74).
155. See Newton, 349 F.3d at 595 (noting importance of original performance).
Although Newton is distinguishable because the Beastie Boys did obtain a sound
recording license, it is still significant because the court found that the actual ex-
pression performed in the flute solo could not be captured even through transpos-
ing the music composition. See id. at 595-96 (placing additional value upon
performance).
156. See Achenbach, supra note 1, at 199 (critiquing Sixth Circuit's failure to
acknowledge unequal bargaining power).
157. See id. at 200 ("The consideration of cost is particularly important when
making a decision that could dramatically increase such costs."). In addition to
noting that the price for the actual license could become extremely high, Achen-
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some copyright holders will never allow for their sound recordings
to be sampled. 158 In accordance with current music industry stan-
dards, artists, who do wish to obtain licenses for digital samples,
must clear both the musical composition and sound recording cop-
yright.159 Although the rights to a musical composition can be ac-
quired via the mechanical compulsory license, the copyright for the
entire musical composition sets the statutorily defined fee, and sam-
plers generally rejected it as an impracticable solution. 160 As a re-
sult, because most songs contain more than one sample, the
compulsory license scheme is prohibitively expensive for many
artists.'61
VI. IMPACT
Noting the Bridgeport case raised complex issues for copyright
law, the Sixth Circuit unanimously affirmed its decision after re-
hearing the case en banc.162 Digital technology, however, still holds
a permanent and important role in the creative efforts of musicians
bach claims that the bargaining process for both the musical composition and
sound recording copyrights also places a potentially deterring financial burden
upon the sampler. See id. at 199-200 (predicting outcome of holding).
158. See generally Bill Werde, Defiant Downloads Rise From Underground, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 25, 2004, at E4 (recounting details of The Grey Album). In 2004, Brian
Burton, a young Los Angeles based disc jockey (DJ) known as Danger Mouse, re-
leased The Grey Album, which took rapper Jay-Z's a cappella version of The Black
Album and mixed it with tracks from the Beatles' White Album. See id. (providing
underlying facts of album's release); see also Achenbach, supra note 1, at 188-89
(articulating details regarding creation of record). Originally releasing only pro-
motional copies, the record quickly gained critical acclaim for its ingenious usage
of both records into a new recording. See Achenbach, supra note 1, at 187 (prais-
ing ingenuity of record).
Because Burton did not attempt to obtain a license to the Beatles' work, EMI,
the owner of the musical composition to the White Album, sent Burton a cease-and-
desist letter once they learned of the album's distribution. See id. at 189 (detailing
EMI's response). Some artists like the Beatles do not allow their work to be sam-
pled under any circumstances. See Werde, supra, at E4 (acknowledging Beatles
refusal of copyright license requests). In addition, it is possible that if Burton did
attempt to clear the licenses for all of the copyrights, the fees would be prohibi-
tively high. See id. ("[I] f Mr. Burton had been able to get permission. . . from both
the Beatles and Jay-Z, he would probably have had to give away more than 100
percent of his publishing rights.").
159. See Norek, supra note 66, at 90-91 (describing current digital sample
clearance procedures).
160. See Szymanski, supra note 76, at 291 n.61 (elucidating impracticability of
compulsory musical composition license for samples).
161. See id. (concluding compulsory licensing scheme unattractive option for
samplers).
162. See generally Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films (Bridgeport IM),
410 F.3d 792, 795 (6th Cir. 2005) (reaffirming prior holding). Aware of these
issues and others raised in the amicus briefs filed by various parties, the Sixth Cir-
cuit recently granted a motion for a rehearing en banc to reconsider its ruling on
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in modern music. 1 63 As one commentator notes, the tension digital
sampling places upon copyright law is rapidly approaching a critical
mass, where musicians, the recording industry, and courts struggle
to determine an appropriate copyright regime that can effectively
deal with digital sampling. 164 Bridgeport is important because it ad-
dresses an important area of digital sampling - the issue of de
minimis use in regards to sound recording copyright infringe-
ment.1 65 In eliminating the de minimis use standard for sound re-
cording infringement, the Sixth Circuit opens the floodgates for
litigation. 166 As a result, numerous commentators that have tradi-
tionally been on opposing sides - those representing the interests
of musicians as well as those representing the interests of copyright
holders - claim that the de minimis use standard should not be
eliminated, albeit for different reasons. 167
i) The Sixth Circuit Opens the Floodgates for Litigation
It is clear that the Bridgeport holding sets a clear and managea-
ble standard for courts to follow. 1 68 Although the court claims its
intent in creating the rule was not simply forjudicial economy, with
nearly 500 cases filed by Bridgeport, setting a bright-line standard is
attractive to potential plaintiffs as well as courts.169 While this rule
may rest upon a debatable statutory analysis, other courts may find
the rule attractive, as it could be perceived as creating greater ease
for copyright enforcement. 70 Plaintiffs can rely on summaryjudg-
the de minimis standard. See Bridgeport III, 410 F.3d 792, 795 (6th Cir. 2005) (con-
cluding issues "worthy of additional consideration").
Upon rehearing, the Sixth Circuit essentially restated its major holdings from
the prior decision. See Bridgeport IV, 410 F.3d at 795 ("After additional briefing and
argument on rehearing, we adhere to our conclusions and amend the opinion to
further clarify our reasoning.").
163. See Szymanski, supra note 76, at 330 (asserting "digital technology may
greatly enrich the creative process by generating countless new, transformative
works").
164. See Achenbach, supra note 1, at 190 (noting struggle between parties in
determining appropriate copyright law).
165. For a discussion of the de minimis use analysis in regards to digital sam-
pling, see supra notes 81-94 and accompanying text.
166. For a discussion regarding the immense litigation that may occur as a
result of the Sixth Circuit's holding, see infra notes 167-72 and accompanying text.
167. For a discussion of how parties on traditionally differing sides of copy-
right law equally oppose the Bridgeport holding, see infra notes 168-71 and accom-
panying text.
168. See Bridgeport 1, 383 F.3d 390, 398 (6th Cir. 2004), amended on reh'g, 410
F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting rule's ease of enforcement).
169. See id. at 399-400 (claiming judicial economy did not motivate decision).
170. For a critique of the statutory justifications for the Sixth Circuit's hold-
ing, see supra notes 138-45 and accompanying text.
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ment to obtain judgments against those who sample even minute
portions of sound recordings. 17'
Although the Sixth Circuit claimed one's views concerning dig-
ital sampling depends upon "where one stands," this easily enforce-
able rule has brought together parties on traditionally opposing
sides of the copyright regime. 172 Parties who have traditionally rep-
resented the interests of the copyright holders have defended the
de minimis standard. 173 The Recording Industry Association of
America ("RIAA") claims the problem created by the Sixth Circuit's
ruling creates retroactive liability for those who properly relied
upon the previous rules. 174 Instead of avoiding litigation, many
predict the Sixth Circuit's ruling will open the floodgates for litiga-
tion. 175 Similarly, the attorney who argued the case for the plain-
tiffs contends that the broad rule will result in more, not less,
litigation and that a case-by-case analysis is still preferable. 76
171. See FED. R. Cirv. P. 56(c) (articulating summary judgment standard). Ap-
plying the Bridgeport rule and eliminating the de minimis use analysis, a copyright
holder would only need to factually demonstrate a musician sampled the sound
recording without a license, in order to obtain summary judgment on the issue of
infringement.
172. See Bridgeport I, 383 F.3d 390, 401 (6th Cir. 2004), amended on reh'g, 410
F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting differing views on sampling). The Sixth Circuit
notes:
As is so often the case, where one stands depends on where one sits.
For example, the sound recording copyright holders favor this interpreta-
tion as do the studio musicians and their labor organization. On the
other hand, many of the hip hop artists may view this rule as stifling
creativity.
Id.
173. See, e.g., Gary Young, Court Clamps Down on 'Sampling; Warnings of Disaster
over 6th Circuit Ruling on Copying Records, NAT'L LJ., Sept. 27, 2004, at 10 (noting
parties traditionally opposed to sampling defending de minimis standard).
174. See id. (proposing holding will cause "a torrent of lawsuits"). The RLAA is
the trade group which represents the record labels in the music industry. See Re-
cording Industry Association of America - About Us, http://www.riaa.com/
about/default.asp (last visited Oct. 12, 2005) (announcing mission statement of
RIAA). The RIAA generally represents the interest of copyright holders such as
the record labels and is the party who brought suits against illegal file sharers. See
Copyright Infringement Lawsuits Brought Against 753 Additional Illegal File Sharers, Feb.
28, 2005, http://www.riaa.com/news/newsletter/022805.asp (touting RIAA's suits
against illegal file sharers).
175. For a discussion of the Sixth Circuit's anticipation that the Bridgeport
holding will lead to more licensing in order to avoid litigation, see supra notes 156-
58 and accompanying text; see also Young, supra note 173, at 10 (warning increase
in litigation will result).
176. See Step Away From the Sampler, KYBoARD MAc., Jan. 2005, http://www.
keyboardmag.com/story.asp?sectioncode=29&storycode=4979 [hereinafter Step
Away] (quoting plaintiff's attorney disagrees with Sixth Circuit's holding).
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ii) The Sixth Circuit's Rule Threatens to Upset the Traditional
Copyright Balance
In addition to a torrent of litigation, the RIAA also argues that
the traditional balance of copyright law will be upset.177 Indeed:
For more than a decade, the music industry has con-
formed its conduct to the existing rules-obtaining li-
censes for sampling when appropriate, and relying on de
minimis and fair use principles if and where they apply. 178
It is possible that the elimination of the de minimis standard
could be solely applied in making the prima facie case for infringe-
ment, to which a fair use defense could then be applied.179 Alterna-
tively, the Bridgeport holding could potentially eliminate any
substantial similarity analysis, which would have significant conse-
quences if applied to the actual fair use defense.' 8 0 The third test
of the fair use defense examines the amount and substantiality of
the taken piece of the work in relation to the whole.' 8 ' If the sam-
pling of a sound recording absent a license is per se infringing, it
eliminates the "amount and substantiality" analysis which would
preclude the defense almost entirely, drastically changing the na-
ture of the copyright regime.' 8 2
iii) Does the Sixth Circuit Pull the Plug on Sampling?
The Sixth Circuit's decision could signal a disastrous result for
rap and hip-hop music.18 3 Some commentators believe that this is
finally time for either the Supreme Court to clarify judicial opinions
on copyright law specifically applicable to sampling, or for Congress
to develop some sort of legitimate statutory scheme to deal with
digital sampling.' 8 4 With the Supreme Court's recent denial of cer-
177. See Young, supra note 173, at 10 (asserting traditional balance of copy-
right law will be upset).
178. Id. (quoting RIAA amicus brief).
179. For a discussion of the prima facie case for copyright infringement, see
supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
180. For a discussion of the amount and substantiality factor of fair use, see
supra note 49 and accompanying text.
181. For a discussion of the fair use defense and its four factors, see supra
notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
182. For a discussion of the fair use defense's limited application in regards to
digital sampling, see supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
183. See Young, supra note 173, at 10 (asserting "[t]he decision will kill off the
art form of hip-hop") (quoting Lawrence E. Feldman)).
184. See Megan Martin, Beastie Boys Win Legal Battle Over Sampling, June 15,
2005, http://www.pitchforkmedia.com/news/05-06/15.shtml ("Groups including
the American Composers Forum, the Electronic Music Foundation and Meet the
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tiorari in Newton, one seemingly permissive rule regarding digital
sampling is firmly entrenched. 185 Should the Supreme Court simi-
larly deny certiorari in Bridgeport, musicians will face both costly and
complex licenses for samples, or potentially face equally cosdy liti-
gation - which will, in effect, pull the plug on digital sampling.18 6
Steven D. Kim
Composer urged the Supreme Court to take the case for the sake of clarifying
copyright law.").
185. See Newton v. Diamond, 125 S. Ct. 2905, 2905 (2005) (denying petition
of writ of certiorari).
186. See Step Away, supra note 176, 9 (advising musicians to acquire licenses
for all samples) (quoting Jay Cooper, former President of National Academy of
Recording Arts and Sciences). While Cooper suggests obtaining licenses for all
samples, he also acknowledges the extreme costs and complexity involved with
clearing samples. See id. (acknowledging complexity of clearing samples).
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